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Paper Title: Deception in Turret Defense Game: Information Limiting Strategy to Induce Dilemma
Authors: Daigo Shishika, Alexander Von Moll, Dipankar Maity, and Michael Dorothy
This paper examines whether deception can arise in a Turret–Attacker differential game when the Turret has only partial information about the Attackers’ maximum speed. It shows that under certain initial conditions, the Attackers can induce a dilemma that forces the Turret to make a guess, creating an incentive for deceptive slower movement.
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Illustration of the Turret–Attacker differential game in continuous time/space (left) and its corresponding information game in extensive form (right). The dashed box indicates the Turret’s information set, where it cannot distinguish whether it is facing a slow or fast attacker and must therefore guess. In this incomplete-information setting, attackers can deliberately adopt a slower (deceptive) movement to induce a dilemma, improving their expected number of breaches. This behavior contrasts with the complete-information setting, where slower movement is strictly suboptimal.